Extensional higher-order logic programming has been introduced as a generalization of classical logic programming. An important characteristic of this paradigm is that it preserves all the well-known properties of traditional logic programming. In this paper we consider the semantics of negation in the context of the new paradigm. Using some recent results from non-monotonic fixed-point theory, we demonstrate that every higher-order logic program with negation has a unique minimum infinite-valued model. In this way we obtain the first purely model-theoretic semantics for negation in extensional higher-order logic programming. Using our approach, we resolve an old paradox that was introduced by W. W. Wadge in order to demonstrate the semantic difficulties of higher-order logic programming.
Introduction
Extensional higher-order logic programming has been proposed (Wadge 1991; Charalambidis et al. 2010; Charalambidis et al. 2013 ) as a generalization of classical logic programming. The key idea behind this paradigm is that all predicates defined in a program denote sets and therefore one can use standard extensional set theory in order to understand their meaning and to reason about them. For example, consider the following simple extensional higher-order program (Charalambidis et al. 2013) stating that a band (musical ensemble) is a group that has at least a singer and a guitarist:
band(B):-singer(S),B(S),guitarist(G),B(G).
In the next section we provide an introduction to the proposed semantics for higherorder logic programming and the remaining sections provide the formal development of this semantics. The proofs of all the results have been moved to corresponding appendices.
An Intuitive Overview of the Proposed Semantics
The starting point for the semantics proposed in this paper is the infinite-valued semantics for ordinary logic programs with negation, as introduced in (Rondogiannis and Wadge 2005) . In this section we give an intuitive introduction to the infinite-valued approach and discuss how it can be extended to the higher-order case.
The infinite-valued approach was introduced in order to provide a minimum model semantics to logic programs with negation. As we are going to see shortly, it is compatible with the well-founded semantics but it is purely model-theoretic 1 . The main idea of this approach can be explained with a simple example. Consider the program:
Under the well-founded semantics both p and s receive the value True. However, p is in some sense "truer" than s. Namely, p is true because there is a rule which says so, whereas s is true only because we are never obliged to make q true. In a sense, s is true only by default. This gave the idea of adding a "default" truth value T 1 just below the "real" truth T 0 , and (by symmetry) a weaker false value F 1 just above ("not as false as") the real false F 0 . We can then understand negation-as-failure as combining ordinary negation with a weakening. Thus ∼ F 0 = T 1 and ∼ T 0 = F 1 . Since negations can effectively be iterated, the infinite-valued approach requires a whole sequence . . . , T 3 , T 2 , T 1 of weaker and weaker truth values below T 0 but above the neutral value 0; and a mirror image sequence F 1 , F 2 , F 3 , . . . above F 0 and below 0. In fact, to capture the well-founded model in full generality, we need a T α and a F α for every countable ordinal α. In other words, the underlying truth domain of the infinite-valued approach is:
As shown in (Rondogiannis and Wadge 2005) , every logic program P with negation has a unique minimum infinite-valued model M P . Notice that M P is minimum with respect to a relation ⊑ which compares interpretations in a stage-by-stage manner (see (Rondogiannis and Wadge 2005) for details). As it is proven in (Rondogiannis and Wadge 2005) , if we collapse all the T α and F α to True and False respectively, we get the well-founded model. For the example program above, the minimum model is {(p, T 0 ), (q, F 0 ), (r, F 1 ), (s, T 1 )}. This collapses to {(p, True), (q, False) , (r, False) , (s, True)}, which is the well-founded model of the program.
As shown in (Rondogiannis and Wadge 2005) , one can compute the minimum infinitevalued model as the least fixed point of an operator T P . It can easily be seen that T P is not monotonic with respect to the ordering relation ⊑ and therefore one can not obtain the least fixed point using the classical Knaster-Tarski theorem. However, T P possesses some form of partial monotonicity. More specifically, as it is shown in (Rondogiannis and Wadge 2005; Ésik and Rondogiannis 2014) , T P is α-monotonic for all countable ordinals α, a property that guarantees the existence of the least fixed point. Loosely speaking, the property of T P being α-monotonic means that the operator is monotonic when we restrict attention to interpretations that are equal for all levels of truth values that are less than α. In other words, T P is monotonic in stages (but not overall monotonic).
The T P operator is a higher-order function since it takes as argument an interpretation and returns an interpretation as the result. This observation leads us to the main concept that helps us extend the infinite-valued semantics to the higher-order case. The key idea is to demonstrate that the denotation of every expression of predicate type in our higherorder language, is α-monotonic for all ordinals α (see Lemma 5). This property ensures that the immediate consequence operator of every program is also α-monotonic for all α (see Lemma 7), and therefore it has a least fixed-point which is a model of the program. Actually, this same model can also be obtained as the greatest lower bound of all the Herbrand models of the program (see Theorem 2, the model intersection theorem). In other words, the semantics of extensional higher-order logic programming with negation preserves all the familiar properties of classical logic programming and can therefore be considered as a natural generalization of the latter.
Non-Monotonic Fixed Point Theory
The main results of the paper will be obtained using some recent results from nonmonotonic fixed point theory (Ésik and Rondogiannis 2013; Ésik and Rondogiannis 2014) . The key objective of this area of research is to obtain novel fixed point results regarding functions that are not necessarily monotonic. In particular, the results obtained in (Ésik and Rondogiannis 2013; Ésik and Rondogiannis 2014) generalize the classical results of monotonic fixed-point theory (namely Kleene's theorem and also the Knaster-Tarski theorem). In this section we provide the necessary material from (Ésik and Rondogiannis 2013;Ésik and Rondogiannis 2014) that will be needed in the next sections.
Suppose that (L, ≤) is a complete lattice in which the least upper bound operation is denoted by and the least element is denoted by ⊥. Let κ > 0 be a fixed ordinal. We assume that for each ordinal α < κ, there exists a preordering ⊑ α on L. We write x = α y iff x ⊑ α y and y ⊑ α x. We define x ❁ α y iff x ⊑ α y but x = α y does not hold. Moreover, we write x ❁ y iff x ❁ α y for some α < κ. Finally, we define x ⊑ y iff x ❁ y or x = y.
Let x ∈ L and α < κ. We define (x] α = {y : ∀β < α x = β y}. A key property that will be used throughout the paper is that if the above preordering relations satisfy certain simple axioms, then the structure (L, ⊑) is a complete lattice; moreover, every function f : L → L that satisfies some restricted form of monotonicity, has a least fixed point. These ideas are formalized by the following definitions and results.
Definition 1
Let (L, ≤) be a complete lattice equipped with preorderings ⊑ α for all α < κ. Then, L will be called a basic model if and only if it satisfies the following axioms:
1. For all x, y ∈ L and all α < β < κ, if x ⊑ β y then x = α y.
2. For all x, y ∈ L, if x = α y for all α < κ then x = y. 3. Let x ∈ L and α < κ. Let X ⊆ (x] α . Then, there exists y (denoted by α X) such that X ⊑ α y 2 and for all z ∈ (x] α such that X ⊑ α z, it holds y ⊑ α z and y ≤ z. 4. If x j , y j ∈ L and x j ⊑ α y j for all j ∈ J then {x j : j ∈ J} ⊑ α {y j : j ∈ J}.
Lemma 1
Let L be a basic model. Then, (L, ⊑) is a complete lattice.
Definition 2
Let A, B be basic models and let α < κ.
It should be noted that even if a function f is α-monotonic for all α < κ, then it need not be necessarily monotonic with respect to the relation ⊑ (for a counterexample, see (Rondogiannis and Wadge 2005, Example 5.7, pages 453-454) ). Therefore, the standard tools of classical fixed point theory (such as the Knaster-Tarski theorem), do not suffice in order to find the least fixed point of f with respect to the relation ⊑.
Let us denote by [A m → B] the set of functions from A to B that are α-monotonic for all α < κ.
Theorem 1
Let L be a basic model and assume that f ∈ [L m → L]. Then, f has a ⊑-least pre-fixed point, which is also the ⊑-least fixed point of f .
The above theorem will be our main tool for establishing the fact that the immediate consequence operator of any extensional higher order logic program, always has a least fixed point, which is a model of the program.
The Syntax of the Higher-Order Language H
In this section we introduce the higher-order language H, which extends classical firstorder logic programming to a higher-order setting. The language H is based on a simple type system that supports two base types: o, the boolean domain, and ι, the domain of individuals (data objects). The composite types are partitioned into three classes: functional (assigned to individual constants, individual variables and function symbols), predicate (assigned to predicate constants and variables) and argument (assigned to parameters of predicates).
Definition 3
A type can either be functional, predicate, argument, denoted by σ, π and ρ respectively and defined as:
We will use τ to denote an arbitrary type (either functional, predicate or argument one).
As usual, the binary operator → is right-associative. A functional type that is different than ι will often be written in the form ι n → ι, n ≥ 1 (which stands for ι → ι → · · · → ι (n + 1)-times). Moreover, it can be easily seen that every predicate type π can be written uniquely in the form ρ 1 → · · · → ρ n → o, n ≥ 0 (for n = 0 we assume that π = o). We can now proceed to the definition of H, starting from its alphabet and continuing with expressions and program clauses:
Definition 4
The alphabet of the higher-order language H consists of the following: the equality constant ≈ of type ι → ι → o; the generalized disjunction and conjunction constants π and π of type π → π → π, for every predicate type π; the generalized inverse implication constants ← π , of type π → π → o, for every predicate type π; the existential quantifier ∃ ρ , of type (ρ → o) → o, for every argument type ρ; the negation constant ∼ of type o → o. 7. The abstractor λ and the parentheses "(" and ")".
The set consisting of the predicate variables and the individual variables of H will be called the set of argument variables of H. Argument variables will be usually denoted by V and its subscripted versions.
Definition 5
The set of expressions of the higher-order language H is defined as follows:
1. Every predicate variable (respectively, predicate constant) of type π is an expression of type π; every individual variable (respectively, individual constant) of type ι is an expression of type ι; the propositional constants false and true are expressions of type o. 2. If f is an n-ary function symbol and E 1 , . . . , E n are expressions of type ι, then (f E 1 · · · E n ) is an expression of type ι. 3. If E 1 is an expression of type ρ → π and E 2 is an expression of type ρ, then (E 1 E 2 ) is an expression of type π. 4. If V is an argument variable of type ρ and E is an expression of type π, then (λV.E) is an expression of type ρ → π. 5. If E 1 , E 2 are expressions of type π, then (E 1 π E 2 ) and (E 1 π E 2 ) are expressions of type π. 6. If E is an expression of type o, then (∼E) is an expression of type o. 7. If E 1 , E 2 are expressions of type ι, then (E 1 ≈ E 2 ) is an expression of type o.
If
E is an expression of type o and V is a variable of type ρ then (∃ ρ V E) is an expression of type o.
To denote that an expression E has type τ we will write E : τ . The notions of free and bound variables of an expression are defined as usual. An expression is called closed if it does not contain any free variables.
Definition 6
A program clause is a clause p ← π E where p is a predicate constant of type π and E is a closed expression of type π. A program is a finite set of program clauses.
Example 1
The subset predicate can be defined in H as follows:
The subset predicate is defined by a λ-expression (which obviates the need to have the formal parameters of the predicate in the left-hand side of the definition). Moreover, in the right-hand side we have an explicit existential quantifier for the variable X (in Prolog, if a variable appears in the body of a clause but not in the head, then it is implicitly existentially quantified).
The Semantics of the Higher-Order Language H
In this section we specify the semantics of H. We start with the semantics of types and proceed to the semantics of expressions.
The meaning of the boolean type o is equal to a partially ordered set (V, ≤) of truth values. The number of truth values of V will be specified with respect to an ordinal κ > 0. All the results of the paper hold for every initial selection of κ. The set (V, ≤) is therefore
where α < κ.
Definition 7
The order of a truth value is defined as follows: order(T α ) = α, order(F α ) = α and order(0) = +∞.
We can now define the meaning of all the types of our language as well as the corresponding relations ≤ and ⊑ α . This is performed in the following definitions:
Definition 8
We define the relation ⊑ α on the set V for each α < κ as follows:
Notice that x = α y iff either x = y or order(x) > α and order(y) > α.
Definition 9
Let D be a nonempty set. Then:
A partial order in this case will not be needed;
, and ≤ ι→π is the partial order defined as follows: for all
, and ≤ π1→π2 is the partial order defined as follows:
The subscripts in the above partial orders will often be omitted when they are obvious from context.
Definition 10
Let D be a nonempty set and α < κ. Then:
The following lemma expresses the fact that all the predicate types correspond to semantic domains that are both complete lattices and basic models:
Lemma 2 Let D be a nonempty set and π be a predicate type. Then, ([[π] ] D , ≤ π ) is a complete lattice and a basic model.
We now proceed to formally define the semantics of H:
Definition 11
An intepretation I of H consists of:
1. a nonempty set D called the domain of I; 2. an assignment to each individual constant symbol c, of an element I(c) ∈ D; 3. an assignment to each predicate constant p : π of an element
Definition 12
Let D be a nonempty set. A state s of H over D is a function that assigns to each argument variable V of type ρ of H, of an element
Definition 13
Let I be an interpretation of H, let D be the domain of I, and let s be a state over D. Then, the semantics of expressions of H with respect to I and s, is defined as follows:
For closed expressions E we will often write [ [E] ](I) instead of [ [E] ] s (I) (since, in this case, the meaning of E is independent of s).
Lemma 3
Let E : ρ be an expression and let D be a nonempty set. Moreover, let s be a state over D and let I be an interpretation over
Definition 14
Let P be a program and let M be an interpretation over a nonempty set D. Then M will be called a model of P iff for all clauses p ← π E of P, it holds [ [E] 
Minimum Herbrand Model Semantics for H
In this section we demonstrate that every program of H has a unique minimum Herbrand model which is the greatest lower bound of all the Herbrand models of the program, and also the least fixed point of the immediate consequence operator of the program. We start with the relevant definitions.
Definition 15
Let P be a program. The Herbrand universe U P of P is the set of all terms that can be formed out of the individual constants 3 and the function symbols of P.
Definition 16
A Herbrand interpretation I of a program P is an interpretation such that:
1. the domain of I is the Herbrand universe U P of P; 2. for every individual constant c of P, I(c) = c; 3. for every predicate constant p : π of P,
4. for every n-ary function symbol f of P and for all t 1 , . . . , t n ∈ U P , I(f) t 1 · · · t n = f t 1 · · · t n .
A Herbrand state of a program P is a state whose underlying domain is U P . We denote the set of Herbrand interpretations of a program P by I P .
Definition 17
A Herbrand model of a program P is a Herbrand interpretation that is a model of P.
Definition 18
Let P be a program. We define the following partial order on I P : for all I, J ∈ I P , I ≤ I P J iff for every π and for every predicate constant p : π of P, I(p) ≤ π J(p).
Definition 19
Let P be a program. We define the following preorder on I P for all α < κ: for all I, J ∈ I P , I ⊑ α J iff for every π and for every predicate constant p : π of P, I(p) ⊑ α J(p).
The following two lemmas play a main role in establishing the two central theorems.
Lemma 4
Let P be a program. Then, I P is a complete lattice and a basic model.
Lemma 5 (α-Monotonicity of Semantics)
Let P be a program and let E : π be an expression. Let I, J be Herbrand interpretations and s be a Herbrand state of P. For all α < κ,
Since by Lemma 4 the set I P is a basic model (and thus by Lemma 1 is a complete lattice with respect to ⊑), every M ⊆ I P has a greatest lower bound M with respect to ⊑. We have the following theorem which generalizes the familiar model intersection theorem for definite first-order logic programs (Lloyd 1987) , the model intersection theorem for normal first-order logic programs (Rondogiannis and Wadge 2005, Theorem 8.6 ) and the model intersection theorem for definite higher-order logic programs (Charalambidis et al. 2013, Theorem 6.8) .
Theorem 2 (Model Intersection Theorem) Let P be a program and M be a nonempty set of Herbrand models of P. Then, M is also a Herbrand model of P.
Definition 20
Let P be a program. The mapping T P : I P → I P is defined for every p : π and for every I ∈ I P as T P (I)(p) = {[ [E] ](I) : (p ← π E) ∈ P}. The mapping T P will be called the immediate consequence operator for P.
The following two lemmas are crucial in establishing the least fixed point theorem.
Lemma 6
Let P be a program. For every predicate constant p : π in P and
Lemma 7
Let P be a program. Then, T P is α-monotonic for all α < κ.
Theorem 3 (Least Fixed Point Theorem) Let P be a program and let M be the set of all its Herbrand models. Then, T P has a least fixed point M P . Moreover, M P = M.
The construction of the least fixed point in the above theorem is similar to the one given for (potentially infinite) propositional programs in (Rondogiannis and Wadge 2005, Section 6). Due to space limitations, we provide a short outline of this procedure. In order to calculate the least fixed point, we start with an interpretation, say I 0 , which for every predicate constant p of type ρ 1 → · · · ρ n → o, and for all
We start iterating T P on this interpretation until we get to a point where the additional iterations do not affect the F 0 and T 0 values. At this point, we reset all the remaining values (regarding predicate constants and arguments that have not stabilized) to F 1 , getting an interpretation I 1 . We start iterating T P on I 1 , until we get to a point where the additional iterations do not affect the F 1 and T 1 values. We repeat this process for higher ordinals. In particular, when we get to a limit ordinal, say α, we reset all the values that have not stabilized to a truth value of order less than α, to F α . The whole process is repeated for κ times. If the value of certain predicate constants applied to certain arguments has not stabilized after the κ iterations, we assign to them the intermediate value 0. The resulting interpretation is the least fixed point M P .
Resolving a Semantic Paradox of Higher-Order Logic Programming
One deficiency of extensional higher-order logic programming is the inability to define rules (or facts) that have predicate constants in their heads. The reason of this restriction is a semantic one and will be explained shortly. However, not all programs that use predicate constants in the heads of clauses are problematic. For example, the program computer scientist(john). good profession(computer scientist).
has a clear declarative reading: the denotation of the computer scientist predicate is the relation {john}, while the denotation of good profession is the relation {{john}}.
In (Wadge 1991) , W. W. Wadge argued that allowing rules to have predicate constants in their heads, creates tricky semantic problems to. Wadge gave a simple example (duplicated below) that revealed these problems; the example has since been used in other studies of higher-order logic programming (such as for example in (Bezem 2001) ). We present the example in almost identical phrasing as it initially appeared.
Example 2 Consider the program: p(a). q(a). phi(p). q(b):-phi(q).
One candidate for minimum Herbrand model is the one in which p and q are true only of a, and phi is true only of p. However, this means that p and q have the same extension, and so themselves are equal. But since p and q are equal, and phi holds for p, it must also hold for q. The fourth rule forces us to add q(b), so that the model becomes {p(a), phi(p), q(a), q(b)} (in ad hoc notation). But this is problematic because p and q are no longer equal and q(b) has lost its justification.
Problems such as the above led Wadge to disallow such clauses from the syntax of the language proposed in (Wadge 1991) . Similarly, the higher-order language introduced in (Charalambidis et al. 2013 ) also disallows this kind of clauses.
However, under the semantics presented in this paper, we can now assign a proper meaning to programs such as the above. Actually, higher order facts such as phi(p). above, can be seen as syntactic sugar in our fragment. A fact of this form simply states that phi is true of a relation if this relation is equal to p. This can simply be written as:
where equal is a higher-order equality relation that can easily be axiomatized in H using the subset predicate (see Example 1):
One can compute the minimum model of the resulting program using the techniques presented in this paper. The paradox of Example 2 is no longer valid since in the minimum infinite-valued model the atom q(b) has value 0. Intuitively, this means that it is not possible to decide whether q(b) should be true or false.
The above discussion leads to an easy way of handling rules with predicate constants in their heads. The predicate constants are replaced with predicate variables and higherorder equality atoms are added in the bodies of clauses. Then, appropriate clauses defining the equal predicates for all necessary types, are added to the program. The infinite valued semantics of the resulting program is taken as the meaning of the initial program.
Future Work
We have presented the first, to our knowledge, formal semantics for negation in extensional higher-order logic programming. The results we have obtained generalize the semantics of classical logic programming to the higher order setting. We believe that the most interesting direction for future work is the investigation of implementation techniques for (fragments of) H, based on the semantics introduced in this paper. One possible option would be to examine the implementation of a higher order extension of Datalog with negation. We are currently examining these possibilities.
We will make use of certain facts established in (Ésik and Rondogiannis 2014) .
Suppose that L is a basic model. For each x ∈ L and α < κ, we define x| α = α {x}. It was shown in (Ésik and Rondogiannis 2014) that x = α x| α and x| α = α x| β , x| α ≤ x| β for all α < β < κ. Moreover, x = α<κ x| α . Also, for all x, y ∈ L and α < κ, it holds x = α y iff x| α = α y| α iff x| α = y| α , and x ⊑ α y iff x| α ⊑ α y| α . And if x ⊑ α y, then x| α ≤ y| α . It is also not difficult to prove that for all x ∈ L and α, β < κ, (x| α )| β = x| min{α,β} . More generally, whenever X ⊆ (z] α and β ≤ α < κ, it holds ( α X)| β = β X. And if α < β, then ( α X)| β = α X. Finally, we will make use of the following two results from (Ésik and Rondogiannis 2014):
Proposition 8
Let A, B be basic models and let α < κ. If f j : A → B is an α-monotonic function for each j ∈ J, then so is f = j∈J f j defined by f (x) = j∈J f j (x).
Lemma 9
Let Z be an arbitrary set and L be a basic model. Then, Z → L is a basic model with the pointwise definition of the order of relations ≤ and ⊑ α for all α < κ.
Suppose that A, B are basic models. By Lemma 9 the set A → B is also a model, where the relations ≤ and ⊑ α , α < κ, are defined in a pointwise way (see (Ésik and Rondogiannis 2014, Subsection 5. 3) for details). It follows that for any set F of functions A → B, F can be computed pointwisely. Also, when F ⊆ (f ] α for some f : A → B, α F for α < κ can be computed pointwisely. We want to show that whenever f : A → B, β < κ and
. We will make use of a lemma.
Lemma 10
Let L be a basic model. For all x, y ∈ L and α, β < κ with α = β, x| β ⊑ α y| β iff either β < α and x| β = y| β (or equivalently, x = β y), or β > α and x| α ⊑ α y| α .
Suppose now that β < α and x| β = y| β . Then (x| β )| α = x| β = y| β = (y| β )| α and thus x| β = α y| β . Finally, let β > α and x| α ⊑ α y| α . Then (x| β )| α = x| α ⊑ α y| α = (y| β )| α and thus x| β ⊑ α y| β .
Remark 1
Under the above assumptions, if β < α, then x| β ⊑ α y| β iff x| β = α y| β iff x| β = y| β .
Corollary 1
For all X, Y ⊆ L and α = β, β X ⊑ α β Y iff β < α and β X = β Y , or β > α and
Lemma 11
Let A and B be basic models. Suppose that f : A → B and 
Proof
It is proved in (Ésik and Rondogiannis 2014) that the set of functions A → B is a basic model with the pointwise definition of the relations ≤ and ⊑ α , so that for all f, g : A → B and α < κ, f ≤ g iff f (x) ≤ g(x) for all x ∈ A and f ⊑ α g iff f (x) ⊑ α g(x) for all x ∈ A. It follows that for any F ⊆ B A and α < κ, F and α F can also be computed pointwise: ( F )(x) = {f (x) : x ∈ A} and ( α F )(x) = α {f (x) : f ∈ F }. By Proposition 8 and Lemma 11, for all F ⊆ B A , if F is a set of functions α-monotonic for all α, then F and 
Let π be a predicate type. We prove that [[π] ] D is a basic model by induction on the structure of π.
] D is a model by the induction hypothesis. Finally, let π be of the sort π 1 → π 2 . By the induction hypothesis,
is also a basic model.
Remark 2
Let C denote the category of all basic models and α-monotonic functions. The above results show that C is cartesian closed, since for all basic models A, B, the evaluation function eval : (A × B) × A → B is α-monotonic (in both arguments) for all α < κ.
Indeed, suppose that f, g ∈ [A m → B] and x, y ∈ A with f ⊑ α g and x ⊑ α y.
Appendix B Proofs of Lemmas 3, 4 and 5
Lemma 3
Proof
If ρ = ι then the claim is clear. Let E be of a predicate type π. We prove simultaneously the following auxiliary statement. Let α < κ,
The proof is by structural induction on E. We will cover only the nontrivial cases.
Case (E 1 E 2 ): The main statement follows directly by the induction hypothesis of E 1 and E 2 . There are two cases. Suppose that E 1 : π 1 → π and 
The second case is similar. We have
Case (λV.E): Assume V : ρ 1 and E : π 2 . We will show that [
If ρ 1 = ι then the result follows easily from the induction hypothesis of the first statement.
That follows directly by the induction hypothesis of the auxiliary statement.
which follows from induction hypothesis.
Lemma 4
Proof
From Lemma 2 we have that for all predicate types π, [[π] ] U P is a complete lattice and a basic model. It follows, by Lemma 9, that for all predicate types π, P π → [[π]] U P is also a complete lattice and a model, where P π is the set of predicate constants of type π. Then,
] U P which is also a basic model (proved in (Ésik and Rondogiannis 2014)).
Lemma 5 (α-Monotonicity of Semantics) Let P be a program and let E : π be an expression. Let I, J be Herbrand interpretations and s be a Herbrand state of P. For all α < κ,
The proof is by structural induction on E.
Induction Base: The cases V, false, true are straightforward since their meanings do not depend on I. Let I ⊑ α J. If E is a predicate constant p then we have I(p) ⊑ α J(p).
Induction
Step: Assume that the statement holds for expressions E 1 and E 2 and let I ⊑ α J. 
which holds by induction hypothesis.
} which holds by induction hypothesis and Axiom 4.
We perform a case analysis on v = {x 1 , x 2 }. If v < F α or v > T α then {x 1 , x 2 } = {y 1 , y 2 } and thus {x 1 , x 2 } ⊑ α {y 1 , y 2 }. If v = F α then F α ≤ {y 1 , y 2 } ≤ T α and therefore {x 1 , x 2 } ⊑ α {y 1 , y 2 }. If v = T α then {y 1 , y 2 } = T α and thus {x 1 , x 2 } ⊑ α {y 1 , y 2 }. If F α < v < T α then F α < {y 1 , y 2 } ≤ T α and therefore {x 1 , x 2 } ⊑ α {y 1 , y 2 }. 
Appendix C Proof of Theorem 2
We start by providing some necessary background material from (Ésik and Rondogiannis 2014) on how the operation on a set of interpretations is actually defined. Let x ∈ V . For every X ⊆ (x] α we define α X as follows:
Let P be a program, I ∈ I P be a Herbrand interpretation of P and X ⊆ (I] α . For all predicate constants p in P of type
Let X be a nonempty set of Herbrand interpretations. By Lemma 4 we have that I P is a complete lattice with respect to ≤ and a basic model. Moreover, by Lemma 1 it follows that I P is also a complete lattice with respect to ⊑. Thus, there exist the least upper bound and greatest lower bound of X for both ≤ and ⊑. We denote the greatest lower bound of X as X and X with respect to relations ≤ and ⊑ respectively. Then, X can be constructed in an symmetric way to the least upper bound construction described in (Ésik and Rondogiannis 2014). More specifically, for each ordinal α < κ we define the sets X α , Y α ⊆ X and x α ∈ I P , which are then used in order to obtain X. Let Y 0 = X and x 0 = 0 Y 0 . For every α, with 0 < α < κ we define X α = {x ∈ X : ∀β ≤ α x = α x α }, Y α = β<α X β ; moreover, x α = α Y α if Y α is nonempty and x α = β<α x β if Y α is empty.
Finally, we define x ∞ = α<κ x α . In analogy to the proof of (Ésik and Rondogiannis 2014) for the least upper bound it can be shown that x ∞ = X with respect to the relation ⊑. Moreover, it is easy to prove that by construction it holds x α = α x β and x β ≥ x α for all β < α.
Lemma 14
Let P be a program, α < κ and M α be a Herbrand model of P. Let M ⊆ (M α ] α be a nonempty set of Herbrand models of P. Then, α M is also a Herbrand model of P.
Proof
Assume α M is not a model. Then, there exists a clause p ← E in P and In the following, we will make use of the following lemma that has been shown in (Ésik and Rondogiannis 2014, Lemma 3.18):
Lemma 15
If α ≤ κ is an ordinal and (x β ) β<α is a sequence of elements of L such that x β = β x γ and x β ≤ x γ (x β ≥ x γ ) whenever β < γ < α, and if x = β<α x β (x = β<α x β ), then x β = β x holds for all β < α.
Lemma 16
Let (M α ) α<κ be a sequence of Herbrand models of P such that M α = α M β and M β ≤ M α for all α < β < κ. Then, α<κ M α is also a Herbrand model of P.
